I recently published a short essay with Professor Danielle Citron critiquing the recent Supreme Court decision, TransUnion v. Ramirez (U.S. June 25, 2021) where the Court held that plaintiffs lacked standing to use FCRA’s private right of action to sue for being falsely labeled as terrorists in their credit reports.
The essay is here:
Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Standing and Privacy Harms: A Critique of TransUnion v. Ramirez, 101 B.U. L. Rev. Online 62 (2021)
Here’s a short abstract:
Through the standing doctrine, the U.S. Supreme Court has taken a new step toward severely limiting the effective enforcement of privacy laws. The recent Supreme Court decision, TransUnion v. Ramirez (U.S. June 25, 2021) revisits the issue of standing and privacy harms under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) that began with Spokeo v. Robins, 132 S. Ct. 1441 (2012). In TransUnion, a group of plaintiffs sued TransUnion under FCRA for falsely labeling them as potential terrorists in their credit reports. The Court concluded that only some plaintiffs had standing – those whose credit reports were disseminated. Plaintiffs whose credit reports weren’t disseminated lacked a “concrete” injury and accordingly lacked standing – even though Congress explicitly granted them a private right of action to sue for violations like this and even though a jury had found that TransUnion was at fault.
In this essay, Professors Daniel J. Solove and Danielle Keats Citron engage in an extensive critique of the TransUnion case. They contend that existing standing doctrine incorrectly requires concrete harm. For most of U.S. history, standing required only an infringement on rights. Moreover, when assessing harm, the Court has a crabbed and inadequate understanding of privacy harms. Additionally, allowing courts to nullify private rights of action in federal privacy laws is a usurpation of legislative power that upends the compromises and balances that Congress establishes in laws. Private rights of action are essential enforcement mechanisms.
Related Articles
Danielle Keats Citron & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Harms (forthcoming in B.U. L. Rev. )
Danielle Keats Citron & Daniel J. Solove, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data Breach Harms, 96 Texas Law Review 737 (2018)
Related Posts
The Trouble with Spokeo: Standing, Privacy Harms, and Biometric Information
When Is a Person Harmed by a Privacy Violation? Thoughts on Spokeo v. Robins
Standing in Data Breach Cases: Why Harm Is Not “Manufactured”
* * * *
This post was authored by Professor Daniel J. Solove, who through TeachPrivacy develops computer-based privacy and data security training. He also posts at his blog at LinkedIn, which has more than 1 million followers.
Professor Solove is the organizer, along with Paul Schwartz, of the Privacy + Security Forum an annual event designed for seasoned professionals.
NEWSLETTER: Subscribe to Professor Solove’s free newsletter
TWITTER: Follow Professor Solove on Twitter.
DARK PATTERNS:
A Privacy Training Course
